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Role of Civil Society Organizations in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Ghana 
 
Abstract 
Ghana is both locally and internationally described as an oasis of peace and stability on a 
continent circumvented by conflicts. The country has not experienced any form of large-scale 
violence or civil war since independence in March 1957. Nevertheless, it is faced with pockets 
of relative violence, including chieftaincy conflict and land dispute, killing several people and 
destroying many properties. In an effort to help resolve these conflicts, the Ghanaian 
government ends up prolonging it due to its position in some of the conflicts. However, the 
review of secondary data revealed that many of the conflicts in Ghana have often needed the 
intervention of civil society organizations to end them, or to bring relative peace since warring 
parties often, do not see the government as neutral. The author recommends that government 
should create the enabling environment for the civil society organizations to operate smoothly 
in their quest to resolve conflicts and to promote peace without the civil society organizations 
compromising their neutrality and objectivity. 
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Introduction 
 Ghana is among the few African countries that have not experienced any form of 
large-scale violence or civil war since independence in March 1957. This is why the country 
has often been described at both the local and international levels as an oasis of peace and 
stability on a continent besieged by conflicts. Ghana is considered one of the most peaceful 
countries in West Africa because, since 1992, the country has witnessed peaceful politico-
democratic transitions. The peaceful general elections that were held in 2000, 2004, 2008, 
2012 and 2016 have made Ghana a beacon of hope for democracy, good governance, peace 
and stability in Africa. The elections in December 2008 and December 2016 for instance, 
represented the second and third time, respectively, that democratically elected incumbent 
presidents uninterruptedly handed over power to the opposition political party. What is 
equally significant is that in the past decade, the Ghanaian electorates have freely ensured a 
turnover of government between the two main political parties, New Patriotic Party (NPP) and 
the National Democratic Congress (NDC) without violence (Arthur, 2010). 
 Moreover, Ghana plays a significant role in resolving conflicts and maintaining peace 
in the West African sub region and beyond. For instance, the Ghanaian Armed Forces (GAF) 
have been at the forefront of peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Mali and Cote 
D'Ivoire among others. The GAF has been instrumental in peacekeeping assignments in 
Rwanda, Lebanon and Cambodia. In addition, Ghana has accepted and hosted a significant 
number of refugees from some West African states like Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire. It is for this 
and other related reasons that the American Fund for Peace in 2009 was prompted to describe 
Ghana as the most peaceful and stable country in Africa (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). 
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 In spite of the international acclamation and praises as well as the flourishing 
democracy in the country, Ghana is faced with diverse forms of violence emanating from 
chieftaincy conflicts, land disputes, ethnic violence and the like. As stated by Aapengnuo 
(2008, p. 1) “there are more than 200 internal conflicts around tradition, chieftaincy authority, 
land and politic”.  These conflicts, though localized, have had dire consequences on the lives 
of people, destroyed properties worth of thousands of Ghanaian Cedis, and above all affected 
the development processes of these communities, especially the Bawku and Dagbon 
communities. For example, several people were murdered in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict 
in Northern Ghana, including the King, Na Ya and some elders in 2002 (Aikins, 2012). 
 In effect, the Ghanaian government spent over Seven Billion Cedis (US $9 million) to 
maintain the fragile peace in Dagbon (Issifu, 2015). In the Konkomba verses Nanumba, and 
the Dagomba verses Nanumba conflicts in 1994/95, over 2000 people died and a good deal of 
property was destroyed (McCandless, Bagu, Oyedele, Gordon-Mensah, Osei & Charlick, 
2001). Besides, 18,900 animals, as well as over 500,000 tubers of yams destroyed and 60,000 
acres of crops set on fire owing to the conflicts (Mahama, 2003). Although Ghana is described 
as a peaceful country, violence occurs from time-to-time, which involves the protagonists 
from various ethnic, religious, economic and political backgrounds.  
 In an attempt to help ensure sustainable peace in violence prone communities in 
Ghana, the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) cannot be overemphasized. In recent 
years, there has been increased recognition of the role CSOs can play as partners with 
government and intergovernmental organizations in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
agenda (Barnes, 2006). CSOs have been instrumental in ensuring some level of stability in 
conflict-shattered areas, especially in the Northern regions of Ghana, where a number of post-
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independence challenges have conspired to create pockets of relative instability and armed 
conflicts (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). The Ghanaian government, in a bid to resolve some of the 
conflicts, ended up prolonging it due to the perceptions of some feuding parties about the 
government’s position in the conflict (Bombande, 2005; Ahiave, 2013). According to the 
scholars; Yakubu (2005), Awedoba (2009), Ahorsu and Gebe (2011), and others, 
government’s interference in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, for instance, started right from 
the first year of colonization to date. The problem of government interference in the majority 
of the conflicts in Ghana tends to make CSOs the preferred option for peace mediation in the 
country (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). According to Arthur (2010), Ghana’s young democracy 
agenda has been helped with the activities of the CSOs in the country, especially the media, 
serving as the preferred peace actors. The media has been instrumental in safeguarding 
Ghana’s democratic principles by performing its watchdog and monitoring functions. In 
particular, it has acted as a check on the government and public office holders by raising 
issues of transparency and accountability relevant for peace and security (Arthur, 2010). 
 Drawing an inspiration from Arthur (2010), Bukari and Guuroh (2013) add that many 
of the conflicts in Ghana have often had to involve the mediation efforts of CSOs to end them 
since factions often perceive the government biased. In cases where the CSOs intervened, 
stability prevailed (Irobi, 2005). Parties in a conflict often see CSOs as neutral and 
trustworthy compared to the government (Irobi, 2005). Bombande (2005) also adds that, “civil 
society has the unique role to accompany communities at various levels to build trust through 
dialogue because in many situations, governments and politicians are not trusted by the 
communities” (p. 35).  This trust gives CSOs the advantage over state institutions to achieve 
the successful resolution of conflicts in Ghana (Bombande, 2005). A typical example is the 
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joint efforts of the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) and the Nairobi Peace 
Initiative (NPI) in Ghana. The PPNT made up of a consortium of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), and the NPI helped to resolve the protracted ethnic conflicts between 
the Konkomba and Nanumba/Dagomba, and the Gonja and Nawari/Konkomba in Northern 
Ghana, by bringing the warring parties together through mediation, which the Ghanaian 
government failed to do (Mahama, 2003).  
 According to Awinador-Kanyirige (2014), had it not been for the timely intervention 
by the PPNT and other CSOs through a series of peace talks and peace education the 
Konkomba and Nanumba/Dagomba, and the Gonja and Nawari/Konkomba conflict in 
Northern Ghana could have become protracted. The most positive results of the efforts were 
the February 1996 Peace Agreement by the NPI between the Dagomba on the one hand, and 
the Konkomba and Basare on the other; and between Nanumbas and Konkombas, which has 
had a positive impact till now (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). 
 Also, when it was finally realized that the 1994 Nanumba-Konkomba conflict had 
engulfed most areas of Northern Ghana, including parts of the Brong-Ahafo and the Volta 
regions, the PPNT ensured that the conflict did not escalate into violence in those areas 
(Mahama, 2003). The PPNT carried out a community sensitization program to educate people 
about the effects of the conflict on development, and the need for peaceful coexistence 
(Mahama, 2003; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). In addition, the effort by these two agencies, 
PPNT and NPI, resulted in the Kumasi-Accord signed on 30th March, 1996, between the 
Dagombas and the Komkonbas/Nanumbas. Additionally, peace accords, were signed between 
the Konkombas and Nawuris; the Gonjas and Komkonbas; the Gonjas and Basaris, all by 
initiative of the PPNT and NPI (Brukum, 2001). The Foundation for Security and 
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Development in Africa also donated metal detectors to the Ghana Police Service to help track 
down illicit arms and ammunitions that contribute to the violence in the Northern region 
(Ekiyor, 2008).  
 Lipchitz and Crawford (1995) postulate that using CSOs and local NGOs in mediation 
is normally the best solution to effective conflict resolution. To them, CSOs are able to set up 
early warning systems and get to the underlying issues of the conflict. For instance, the Inter-
Faith Dialogue made up of Churches and the Muslim communities provided early warning 
signals to the appropriate security agencies to set up conflict prevention mechanisms that 
prevented the Bawku chieftaincy conflict from escalating in the neighboring communities 
(Lipchitz & Crawford, 1995; Bukari, 2013). On like the 1994 inter-communal conflict 
between the Nanumba and Konkomba, where the violence was compounded by the smuggling 
of small arms from Burkina Faso and Togo, the CSOs in the Bawku conflict worked to ensure 
that the smuggling of small arms was adequately checked using the early warning signal to the 
security agencies (McCandless et al., 2001; Bukari, 2013). The use and involvement of CSOs 
in conflict resolution have been essential and successful in Ghana because they are often seen 
as neutral, and understands the local dynamics and the roots of the conflicts (Agyeman, 2008).  
 The tremendous roles of the CSOs in conflict resolution and peacebuilding have made 
these organizations important partners in contemporary peace efforts. The paper seeks to 
explore the role of CSOs in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Ghana, particularly the 
protracted Bawku chieftaincy conflict and the intractable Dagbon chieftaincy crisis. The paper 
is organized as follows: section one discusses conceptual issues, section two presents an 
overview of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict and, the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, while the 
role of the CSOs in each of these conflicts is discussed in section three. The impacts and 
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contributions of CSOs, and the factors enabling their acceptance in Ghana are discussed in 
sections four and five. The challenges facing CSOs, followed by a conclusion and 
recommendations, are provided in section six of the paper. 
 
Conceptualizing Issues 
  In Ghana, most of the conflict resolution methods by the CSOs have ensured a 
sustainable peace because of their neutrality: they take into account the cultural needs of the 
feuding parties and goes deep down to underlying the structural causes of the conflict, and to 
provide a holistic win-win solution (Bukari, 2013). Like conflict resolution, peacebuilding is 
the process of providing the conditions necessary for preventing conflict from reoccurring. In 
his An Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to solidify 
peace and avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Building on Boutros-Ghali’s 
definition, Porter (2007) added that CSOs are working in the field of peacebuilding that build 
positive relationships, heal wounds, reconcile antagonistic differences, meet basic needs, 
enhance equality, instill feelings of security, empower moral agency, and are democratic, 
inclusive and just. The CSOs in Ghana are working in the field of peacebuilding as described 
by Porter in 2007. 
 According to Barnes (2006), examples of the civil society groups that have a stake in 
peacebuilding include social movements, business associations, trade unions and professional 
bodies, cooperatives and self-help initiatives. In addition, CSOs, including NGOs, media, 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) are very 
active in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Ghana.  I have discussed below the conflict 
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resolution and peacebuilding roles played by the CSOs in the Bawku chieftaincy conflict as 
well as the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict in Northern Ghana. 
 
The Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict 
 The Mamprusi and Kusasi chieftaincy conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area (BTA) 
reflects the general phenomenon of ethnic tensions and conflicts that has engulfed the African 
continent in the last fifty years (Longi, 2015). The root causes of this conflict are largely 
traceable to the introduction of secular political authority/chieftaincy in areas, which before 
colonialism, were described as stateless or Acephalous societies (Longi 2015). However, the 
actions and inactions of the post-colonial Ghanaian governments such as, the interference in 
chieftaincy matters more than any factor set the stage for the intractable Mamprusi and Kusasi 
conflict in the Upper East Region of Ghana (Longi, 2015). Bukari and Guuroh (2013) affirm 
that the conflict is identity-based and revolves around the claim for traditional political power 
(chieftaincy) between the Kusasis and Mamprusis in the BTA. Since the 1930s, the conflict 
has taken different dimensions and has remained intense and unresolved.  
 The primary actors in the conflict, the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, have both taken 
entrenched positions, making the conflict protracted (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). The first clash 
between the two groups occurred in 1957 and between 1980, 2000 and 2010 the two groups 
have clashed several times, leading to devastating consequences (Longi, 2015).  For instance, 
according to the Police Intelligence Report for 2009, there were 12 murder cases, 32 robbery 
cases, and 40 cases of arson related to the conflict (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). It was also 
revealed in the same report that, from 2007 to 2010, the total number of deaths recorded was 
78, but some deaths may not have been recorded (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013).  
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 Nevertheless, frantic efforts have been made in resolving the conflict since its 
inception. The Ghanaian government and some political parties have intervened with the aim 
to create some stability in the area. However, their actions seem to have degenerated into 
conflict (Longi, 2015). Bukari and Guuroh (2013) have confirmed the two warring ethnic 
groups in the conflict align themselves with the two key political parties in the country; the 
NDC being on the side of the Kusasis, whereas the NPP supports the Mamprusis. The political 
interference in the conflict makes it more unresolvable because when any of the political 
parties come into power and attempt to resolve the conflict, they end up favoring their sides, 
which leads to an opposition against the outcome of the other group (Bombande, 2005). 
 Following the interference of political parties and the inability of the government to 
resolve the conflict, a number of CSOs had to come in to help resolve the conflict since they 
are perceived trustworthiness (Bombande, 2005). In congruence, Bukari and Guuroh (2013) 
maintained that the government does not have the political will and the trust by the parties to 
mediate in ending the conflict because of its perceived alignment with one faction. The CSOs 
through a series of community-based peace education programs, and awareness creation on 
conflict effect and sensitization programs on the costs of the Bawku conflict motivated the 
feuding parties to sign the Bawku Peace Accord as well as the Damongo Peace Agreement 
(Bombande, 2005; Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). These efforts have led to the conflict resolution 
and the creation of a relative peace in the BTA (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). The next section 
discusses in details the roles played by the CSOs in the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. 
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The Role of CSOs in the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict 
 The role of CSOs in peacebuilding in the Bawku conflict has been significant, 
especially in ensuring some level of relative peace in the area. Bukari and Guuroh (2013) have 
argued that a number of CSOs since 2001 made efforts at mediating to end the conflict 
through peacebuilding processes and conflict resolution mechanisms. For instance, a 
consortium of CSOs, including Action Aid Ghana, WANEP, Advocacy Peace Group - IBIS 
(Ghana) spearheaded the Bawku Peace Accord that was signed between the stakeholders in 
the conflict at the Damongo Peace Agreement (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). Moreover, the 
Catholic Relief Services has been essential in ensuring the relative peace, which is currently 
enjoyed in Bawku through the provision of relief services, including sleeping mattress, 
temporal shelter, foodstuffs, malaria drugs, treated mosquito nets and the like. Other CSOs, 
including the Christian Council of Ghana and the Bawku East Women’s Development 
Association (BEWDA) have also been instrumental in bringing peace to the area through a 
community based peace education programs (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). 
 Also, it is on record that NGOs, together with the National Peace Council (NPC), a 
body established by law to promote peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the country, 
mediated and orchestrated a roadmap to peace in the area (Bukari, 2013). In addition, CSOs 
with the factions in the conflict formed the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee in 2010 to 
help resolve the conflict. The effort of the CSOs in the conflict has been helpful in curbing 
violence in the area (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). More so, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), an international organization [not a CSO per say, but working to support 
the mainstream CSOs] has been supporting the NPC financially through the Ministry of 
Interior so that they can equip the military and police forces to help keep peace in the areas 
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(Draman, Mohammed & Woodrow, 2009). Just like most of the mainstream CSOs, the UNDP 
mediated to end the conflict and build capacity for peace processes by funding peace activities 
(Draman et al., 2009). 
 Specifically, these are the roles played by the CSOs/NGOs in the peacebuilding 
process in the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. First, WANEP facilitated the Damango Peace 
Talks in June 2001 that brought about the Bawku Peace Initiative. Apart from that, it 
facilitated the Kumasi Peace Talks in 2010 and provided funding for the peace process. 
WANEP is currently coordinating the peace actions of all CSOs in the conflict. Second, the 
BEWDA mediates among all the feuding factions, organizes peace education and sensitization 
in local communities, and coordinates the peacebuilding activities at the local level. Third, 
World Vision-Ghana collaborated with WANEP to facilitate the Kumasi Peace Talks in 2010 
and prior to that helped to bring the Bawku Peace Initiative in 2001, and currently provides 
peace education to the disputing groups (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). Fourth, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) collaborated with WANEP to facilitate the Kumasi Peace Talks in 
2010 and provided funding for the peace process as well as helping to bring the Bawku Peace 
Initiative in 2001. UNICEF in addition, advocates for the protection of children in the conflict 
zone. Fifth, the Northern Development Forum (NDF) played an advocacy role in demanding 
for peace between the factions serving as a pressure group for peace in the area, and actively 
participated in the Kumasi Peace Talks in 2010.  
 The Centre for Conflict Transformations and Peace Studies (CECOTAPS) participated 
in the Damango Peace Talks in June 2001, which brought about the Bawku Peace Initiative, 
and also played advocacy role in the peace process. Finally, the Catholic Diocese, Christian 
Council of Ghana, Muslim Council of Ghana and the Presbyterian Church-Ghana, all 
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participated actively in the Damango Peace Talks in June 2001, paving way for the Bawku 
Peace Initiative and the Kumasi Peace Talks in 2010. Currently, they are providing peace 
education and sensitization in local communities as part of the post conflict peacebuilding 
measures (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). The current relative peace in Bawku could not be 
possible if the CSOs had not intervened (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). The peacebuilding 
approaches employed by the CSOs in the Bawku conflict, including the peace education, 
sensitization activities on peacebuilding, organization of inter-ethnic games, and the signing 
of peace agreements has created a relatively peaceful coexistence between the two feuding 
parties in the conflict.  
 Bukari and Guuroh (2013) affirm that the role of the CSOs in the Bawku conflict has 
been very helpful in stemming the spate of violence in the area. They reiterate that because of 
the persistent violence, the total number of deaths recorded from 2007 to 2009 was 78 (Bukari 
& Guuroh, 2013). However, involvement of the CSOs in mediation talks with the feuding 
parties, and the community-based peace education and training, as well as the participatory 
peace campaigns helped to reduce the spate of violence in the area (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). 
Particularly, the WANEP played and still playing mediation, peace campaign and training 
roles, which has contributed to the relative peace in the area (Annan, 2013). Agyeman (2008) 
states that since the Fourth Republic in the early 1990s, CSOs have helped Ghana, particularly 
in the flashpoint communities in Northern Ghana, including Bawku in managing and 
resolving conflicts through the organization of participatory inter-ethnic and tribal games to 
build peaceful coexistence among the factions in the conflict. 
 WANEP through a community based peace education and the awareness creation 
programs on the effects of the conflict, which was organized for the youth, opened their eyes 
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to see the huge socio-economic cost of the conflict, hence making them to eschew from 
participating in the conflict. For instance, the peaceful nature of the 2012 election campaign in 
the Bawku area compared to previous election years, where the feuding parties clashed 
frequently on political lines, bear testimony to the fact that the youth in the area are now 
refraining from taking active part in the conflict (Kendie, Osei-Kufuor & Kwaku, 2014). Due 
to the youth’s active participation in the series of the community-based peace education 
programs organized by the CSOs they are now being fed up with the conflict (Kendie et al., 
2014). The youths are currently refusing to take up arms, and some have become informants 
and early warning signal providers to the military and police to intensify security in the area 
(Kendie et al., 2014).   
 Additionally, the desire of the youth in Northern Ghana, including Bawku in recent 
times, not to take part in the conflict is linked to the effort of the Community Development 
and Youth Advisory Centre (CODEYAC), the Northern Region Youth and Development 
Association (NORYDA), Ghana Association for Private Voluntary Organization in 
Development (GAPVOD), the Northern Ghana Network for Development (NGND-the 
“Network”).  They educated the youth through peace campaigns and awareness creation on 
the socio-economic and environmental effects of conflict in Northern Ghana, and the need for 
a peaceful coexistence (McCandless et al., 2001). Although these groups are intermediary 
level and work only in Northern Ghana, youth-based networks such as NORYDA are 
particularly important because they have demonstrated in their peace activities that the youth 
can play a central role in securing and maintaining peace through local CSOs (McCandless et 
al., 2001).  Currently, in general, there is a relative peace in the area, which CSOs and NGOs 
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have played a key role to that effect. Like the Bawku chieftaincy conflict, CSOs have also 
played a crucial role in bringing a relative peace in Dagbon.  
 
The Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict 
 The manifestation of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict was in 1954 when the Ya Na 
Abudulai III from the Abudu royal gate succeeded his father (Na MahamaBla III) (Mahama, 
2003). After fifteen (15) years, Ya Na Abudulai III died and an attempt by some elders 
succeeded in imposing Mahamadu Abudulai IV, a regent from the Abudu gate as successor to 
his late father. Meanwhile, the Mion Lana Andani, a regent of Mion was the right person to 
succeed the late Ya Na Abudulai III based on the rotation system (Aikins, 2012). 
Consequently, impartial Kingmakers deskinned Mahamadu Abudulai IV to allow the Mion 
Lana Yakubu Andani from the Andani gate enskinned. Eventually, if the regent, Mahamadu 
Abudulai, had been installed this would have been the third time since 1948 that the Abudu 
gate would have occupied the throne to the rejection of the Andani gate (Aikins, 2012).  
 After the enskinment of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, there was a form of relative peace 
in the area until a misunderstanding between the two gates led to the Ya Na’s killing (Issifu & 
Asante, 2015). Like the Bawku chieftaincy conflict, the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict has also 
taken a political dimension; the NPP and NDC parties have aligned to the Abudu and Andani 
royal gates respectively (Issifu & Asante, 2015). The motive is for them to score cheap 
political points that in turn prolonged the conflict. It is argued that, the late Ya Na Yakubu 
Andani II, for instance, was healthily alive during the regime of the NDC government. 
However, he was killed in cold blood on March 27, 2002, during the era of the NPP 
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government (Brukum, 2001; Ahiave, 2013). The Andani gate and their sympathizers believe 
the NPP government had a hand in the death of late Ya Na Yakubu  Andani II (Ahiave, 2013). 
 Current and recent past governments through the National, Regional and District 
Security Councils, Commissions and Committees, Court, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of 
Interior (police and the military) have attempted to resolve the fight, but the conflict kept 
reoccurring (Bombande, 2005). A myriad of factors have been identified as challenges to the 
resolution of the conflict and key among them was perceived as political interference. As 
Ahiave (2013) righty confirms, “there are several documentations about government 
interference in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict since the colonial period to date” (p. 28). Also, 
Issifu (2015) in his study found that, “manipulations of historical memories to evoke emotions 
such as fear, resentment and hatred by some politicians and conflict entrepreneurs into the 
minds of the younger generation have contributed to the intractable nature of the chieftaincy 
conflict in Dagbon” (p. 36).  
 Politicians have been blamed for not showing a strong political will towards resolving 
the conflict since they were not courageous enough to deal with issues that would lead to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict, which obviously, would not give them the needed political 
capital (Alhassan, 2007). The perceived lack of political will coupled with political 
interference has contributed to the intractable nature of the Dagbon conflict (Brukum, 2001; 
Yakubu, 2005). Reasons why the government is not seen as a neutral mediator or a forerunner 
in securing a lasting peace in the area is that some politicians would not like the conflict 
resolved completely because of the desire to score cheap political points (Ateng & Abazaami, 
2016). These conflict entrepreneurs see the efforts of the CSOs to resolving the conflict as a 
direct opposition to their political gains (Ateng & Abazaami, 2016).  The Dagbon conflict has 
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been complicated by the influence of some politicians and political parties in Ghana (Tsikata 
& Seini, 2004). This is why CSOs had to intervene to ensure that peace and stability prevailed 
in the area.  
 The WANEP-Ghana has played and is still playing a useful role in ending the conflict 
in the area. In 2007, the WANEP implemented radio programs on peace and stability in the 
Northern region of Ghana, where Dagbon is located. The radio program became an outreach 
opportunity to continue sensitizing the people on various peace activities in the area (WANEP 
Annual Report, 2008). The resulting impact of the radio peace program was that, as Tamale, 
the Northern regional capital, was one of the host cities for the 2008 African Cup of Nations, a 
radio program was aired aimed at sending conflict prevention and early warning messages 
throughout the tournament. The program emphasized the need for all the feuding factions in 
the region to bury their hatchets during the period to provide a safe environment for visitors 
coming from all over Africa and the world to enjoy the tournament. In effect, peace and 
stability was achieved before, during and after the tournament (WANEP Annual Report, 
2008).  
The Role of CSOs in the Dagbon Conflict 
 It has been further found that CSOs have played diverse but important roles in 
mitigating the adverse effects of the Dagbon conflict. One of such CSOs include the Yendi 
Peace Centre (YPC), a faith-based organization run by the Catholic Dioceses of Yendi whose 
role members of both feuding gates acknowledged are neutral and trustworthy (Ahiave, 2013). 
Aside the YPC, other CSOs, FBOs, NGOs and specialized United Nations agencies on their 
own initiatives and sometimes in collaboration with the state played major roles in mitigating 
the adverse effects of the Dagbon conflict (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). Apart from the provision 
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of relief services to the displaced during the conflict, they also engaged in sensitization 
programs aimed at educating people on the need for peaceful co-existence in Dagbon. Most of 
the CSOs during the Dagbon conflict provided relief and humanitarian assistance in the form 
of food, assorted drinks, shelter, and mattresses, cooking utensils, water and the like. In 
addition, some of the CSOs engaged in direct or indirect negotiation with the feuding parties 
for the first time (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011).  
 The YPC organized over ninety (90) meetings, including workshops, seminars, and 
fora that brought both members of the Abudu and Andani gates as well as youths and 
women’s groups together in peace making process (Ahiave, 2013). Again, the aim of the YPC 
was to involve all the stakeholders in the peace process in Yendi for the swift development of 
the area. According to Ahiave (2013), the YPC is, thus, recognized as the first organization to 
bring the feuding factions together for peace making. In addition, the role of the Federation of 
Moslem Women Association of Ghana (FOMWAG), UNDP, Community Life Improvement 
Program (CLIP) and the Ghana Danish Community Association (GDCA) was vital in the 
Dagbon peace process. They engaged the people in activities, including peace education, 
awareness creation on the effects of conflict, peace sensitizations, and community based 
economic support aimed at improving their socio-economic standards in the peacebuilding 
process. 
 More so, the role of traditional civil society groups made up of Kings, local chiefs and 
opinion leaders like family heads, sectional leaders, Tindaanas, and community elders have 
been instrumental in creating an avenue for peace in Dagbon. Generally, the existence of 
chiefs in Ghana has helped to ensure relative peace and order as well as regulate the conduct 
of people (Annan, 2013). For example, the Committee of the Four Eminent Chiefs led by 
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Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, Ashanti King, with the responsibility of finding a durable solution to 
the chieftaincy dispute in Dagbon has been essential (Issifu& Asante, 2015). After a long 
period of deliberations and a series of negotiations initiated by the committee, representatives 
of the two battling gates in Dagbon signed a “Roadmap to Peace” on 30th March, 2006. The 
“Roadmap to Peace” enumerated five major benchmarks in the conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding process in the area. These five major benchmarks to peace in the area include: 
first, to perform the burial of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II; second, the installation of the 
regent of the late king; third, the performance of the funeral of the deposed Mahamadu 
Abdulai IV; fourth, the performance of the funeral of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II; and finally, 
the selection and enskinment of a new Ya Na for Dagbon. 
 The roadmap has been able to ensure the burial of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II 
and the installation of the regent of the late king as well as the performance of the funeral of 
the deposed Mahamadu Abdulai IV, which at least has brought some degree of relative peace 
in Dagbon (Issifu & Asante, 2015). As a result of a preliminary agreement reached through 
the formal process: “Roadmap to Peace”, the Ya Na was finally buried on April 10 2006, and 
on April 21, his eldest son, Kamkanpuya-Na Abdulai Andani, was enskinned as regent of 
Yendi, and this has contributed to a relative peace in the area (Draman et al., 2009).  
 In addition to working with traditional civil society groups, the Committee of the 
Eminent Chiefs, and the UNDP, supported the work of other CSOs to promote peace in 
Dagbon by funding workshops for various socio-cultural groups such as the artisans 
(macheli), butchers (nakohas), youth chiefs (zaachis) and leaders of women groups 
(magazias) who are all key stakeholders in the area. The UNDP supported consultation 
workshops that brought key persons from the Andanis and Abudus for the first time and for 
19 
 
 
 
finding a lasting peace in the area (Draman et al., 2009). These efforts by the CSOs have all 
contributed to the relative peace currently seen in Dagbon. This indicates that, without the 
peace and mediation activities, as well as the independent and neutral role of CSOs, the 
relative peace currently enjoyed in Dagbon would have been in shambles. 
 
Impacts and Contributions of CSOs in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Ghana 
 CSOs participation in conflict in recent times has seen a major reduction in the 
severity, and the number of conflict cases in Ghana. Without their involvement in 
contemporary conflicts, most of the protracted violent conflicts, including Bawku and the 
Dagbon chieftaincy conflicts could have led to a serious violence as realized in the 1994 
Kokomba-Nanumba vicious conflict, which 5,000 people died (Bombande, 2007). One of the 
key reasons for Ghana’s current stability in general and the relative peace in Northern Ghana 
in particular can be attributed to the impacts and contributions of the CSOs. The UN in recent 
times has made some effort by supporting and collaborating with the CSOs who have been 
involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Ghana (Bombande, 2007). From the two 
conflict cases discussed above, CSOs through awareness creation, sensitization, education, 
dialogue, workshops, seminars, fora, mediation, peace initiatives, financial and technical 
assistance, and other activities have positively impacted largely in chieftaincy related conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding in Ghana.  
 Again, CSOs have made and are still making a significant contribution in the 
Ghanaian policy terrain by calling for and ensuring transparency in the political and policy-
making process (Arthur, 2010). During the 2000 elections, several CSOs groups such as 
Ghana Alert, Ghana Legal Literacy Resources Foundation and the Coalition of Domestic 
20 
 
 
 
Election Observers (CODEO) recruited, trained and deployed more than 15,000 observers to 
cover events and developments that occurred at about half of the more than 20,000 polling 
stations in Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). This was followed with the deployment of 7400 
observers in all 10 regions of the country to observe the presidential and parliamentary 
elections (Arthur, 2010) so that, in the case of electoral dissatisfaction that can lead to 
conflict, evidence can be provided in a resolution. The attempts by CODEO and other CSOs 
have contributed positively to Ghana’s peaceful atmosphere and the international admirations 
as the doyen of democracy in Africa, with accompanying benefits and international support. 
 Ghana’s growing international prestige has helped bring a substantial external aid and 
assistance to the country (Arthur, 2010). These benefits and recognitions could not be 
obtained without the active role of the CSOs in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, and 
democracy in the country. As Bukari and Guuroh (2013) asserts, since Ghana’s democratic 
transition in 1992, the country has made significant efforts to consolidate its democracy, and 
there have been a number of significant changes and improvements in its democratic system 
influenced largely by the CSOs in the country. Ghana is widely regarded as an example of 
democratic success in the West African region, partly because of the progressive CSOs 
activities (Oxfam Research Reports, 2013). 
 
Factors Enabling the Acceptance of CSOs in Ghana 
 The acceptance of CSOs in Ghana, particularly, in the Northern regions is attributed to 
a number of key factors, including issues such as neutrality and impartiality, and the 
traditional peacebuilding approach of CSOs in the peace process. CSOs in their quest to 
intervene in conflict situations remain neutral and impartial. On like the Ghanaian government 
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using a formal court system, where win-lose approach to conflict resolution is often seen, 
CSOs focus on the root causes of a conflict, and as such, are able to provide a win-win 
solution and recommendations to address the conflict permanently. Agyeman (2008) suggests 
that the use and involvement of local CSOs and NGOs in conflict resolution is necessary in 
Ghana and other African countries since they understand the local dynamics and the roots of 
the conflicts, and are therefore in good positions to mediate a conflict successfully.  
 This approach has made the work of the CSOs legitimate and acceptable to parties and 
communities in the conflict (Ateng & Abazaami, 2016). According to Fitzduff (2004), CSOs 
have embedded neutrality and impartiality in their course to supporting peacebuilding 
activities and therefore they are much freer than governments in deciding to which of the 
parties they will talk with, and have used this opportunity to talk to those who are often 
outside the reach of governments in most conflicts. This is the case of the CSOs in Ghana. As 
argued by Brukum (2001), Ahiave (2013) and Issifu (2015), the neutrality nature of the CSOs 
in Ghana, has made them trustworthy in the peace making processes in Ghana. The basic 
approach by the CSOs in Northern Ghana, for example, was the creation of platforms, guided 
by the neutrality principle of active participation. They involved of all the stakeholders; 
primary, secondary and tertiary into the peace making process. The platform, according to 
Ateng and Abazaami (2016), allowed the parties/stakeholders to own the resolution processes. 
 The grassroots approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding by the CSOs 
encourages conflicting parties to free participate and to identify their needs and interest in the 
conflict (Agyeman, 2008). This has been the approach of the CSOs in the Bawku conflict 
(Kendie et al., 2014). The active participation of the youth promoted the ownership of the 
whole peace process as well as the people having confidence in whatever is being done. The 
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ownership of the conflict resolution process also creates the enabling atmosphere for a 
sustainable peace because it is from within the people’s worldview.  
 Supporting the same viewpoint, Okrah (2003) opines that, CSOs applies traditional 
systems of conflict resolutions, such as truth-saying, win-win conflict outcomes, and culture 
and belief systems in conflict resolution and peace making. Local CSOs such as WANEP and 
BEWDA among others, are accepted in the Northern regions, because they are guided by the 
traditional approaches to peacebuilding, which focus on the principles of restorative justice 
rather than retributive justice, restitution of friendship rather than fault-finding, dialogue 
rather than blame, and cooperativeness rather than assertiveness (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). 
Despite their acceptability, CSOs are also bereft with certain challenges, as the article 
discusses next.  
Challenges Facing Civil Society Organizations in Ghana 
 Although CSOs/NGOs in Ghana have played and continue to play a key role in 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding, they are also faced with criticisms. For instance, lack of 
accountability is a key challenge facing the CSOs in Ghana. The majority of these groups 
often do not have accountability measures and oversight mechanisms, which ensure that their 
actions are regulated both by the state and by the populace (Annan, 2013). There are limited 
mechanisms to hold them accountable. The accountability of certain CSOs vis-à-vis the local 
communities are generally low, as well as their transparency. As legal frameworks do not 
provide accountability mechanisms, some fraudulent CSOs take advantage of this vacuum to 
defraud communities (World Bank 2005, p. 16).  
 Besides, other CSOs have developed higher responsiveness upward to donors than 
downward to beneficiaries. This raises concern as their activities have the potential to create 
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tensions. Despite some key concerns with the role of CSOs in Ghana, the cases discussed 
above suggest that, given their traditional relationships and perceived neutrality, their role in 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding has been indispensable. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 In an effort to help build peace in conflict prone areas, the government of Ghana 
attempted to resolve the conflict through state the apparatus, but their intervention is often 
seen as biased by the disputing parties, hence prolonging the conflict and making resolutions a 
far-reaching aspiration. However, when CSOs intervened, they ensured peace and created 
avenues for a sustainable peacebuilding. Despite their positive impacts in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding, the state has not created the enabling environment for them to operate 
smoothly even though they [CSOs] are considered the preferred choice for resolving conflict. 
 It is recommended that the Ghanaian government should assist CSOs financially in 
their quest to resolve conflicts and to promote peace without the CSOs compromising their 
neutrality and objectivity. CSOs should continue the sensitization and peace facilitation 
programs. They should, however, continue to remain neutral, trustworthy and resolute in their 
mediation efforts to sustain their acceptability. Again, the Ghanaian government should work 
hard to restore hope in the populace regarding its neutrality in conflict issues in the country. 
This can be done through a strong institutional framework, including a robust law available to 
deal with the unscrupulous politicians found using conflicts to score cheap political points. 
This will ensure that the unethical politicians and government agents who double as conflict 
entrepreneurs would be mindful of their pronouncements on conflict issues.  
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 More so, there should be some legal mechanisms put in place to make CSOs 
accountable. This will ensure that CSO’s actions are regulated, but not unnecessarily 
influenced by the state and some politicians.  
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